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CASE COMMENTS

CONSTITUTIONAL LAW: A NEW RIGHT TO JURY TRIAL
IN STATE CRIMINAL CONTEMPT CASES
Bloom v. Illinois, 88 S. Ct. 1477 (1968)
Petitioner was held in contempt of the Circuit Court of Cook County,
Illinois, for filing a spurious will for probate in that court. His timely
demand for a jury trial was denied, and he was convicted of criminal contempt
and sentenced to two years in the county jail.
Appealing to the Illinois supreme court,1 petitioner contended that the
conduct for which he was convicted of criminal contempt constituted the
crime of forgery,2 punishable by from one to fourteen years imprisonment
and to which the right to jury trial attached. This claim was rejected by
the court, and the conviction and sentence were upheld.
On certiorari, the United States Supreme Court HELD, the constitutional
guarantees of jury trial in article III, section 2, and the sixth amendment
extend to serious criminal contempts in state courts, through the due process
clause of the fourteenth amendment. Justices Harlan and Stewart dissenting.
Criminal contempts are acts done in disrespect of a court or its process,
or which obstruct the administration of justice or tend to bring the court
into disrespect.3 There are two types of criminal contempt: direct contempts
committed into the presence of the court or in dose proximity thereof, and
indirect contempts committed completely outside the court. 4 Criminal con-

5
tempts have often been said to be sui generis, or in a class all of their own,
but there are cases holding them to be criminal offenses. 5 It has also been held
that neither constitutional or legislative authority is necessary to enable a
7
court to punish for contempt, and that such power is inherent in all courts.
In Illinoiss there is no limitation on a sentence for criminal contempt,

1.

People v. Bloom, 35 II. 2d 255, 220 N.E.2d 475 (1966).

2. 38 ILL. ANN. STAT. §17-3 (Smith-Hurd 1964).
3. R. PmxN.s, CRIMIuAL LAW 458 (1957).
4. Id. at 460.
5. State v. Lush, 168 Neb. 367, 95 N.W.2d 695 (1959); Osborn v. Owsley, 364 Mo. 544,
264 S.W.2d 332 (1954); Ballengee v. State, 144 So. 2d 68 (2d D.CA.. Fla. 1962).
6. Gompers v. United States, 233 U.S. 604, 610 (1914); Lapique v. Superior Court, 68
Cal. App. 407, 229 P. 1010 (1924); State v. Cunningham, 33 W. Va. 607, 11 S.E. 76 (1890).
7. Myers v. United States, 264 U.S. 95 (1924); United States v. Hudson, 11 U.S. (7
Cranch) 32 (1812).
8. In Florida there is no statutory limit on punishment for criminal contempt except
with regard to sentences imposed by justices of the peace. FLA. STAT. §38.2 (1967). See also
FLA. STAT. §§39.13, 932.03 (1967). In the same statute it is provided that there can be no
jury trial, and this has been held to give the trial judge no discretion on the matter. Dodd
v. State, 110 So. 2d 22 (3d D.CA. Fla. 1959). The Florida Rules of Criminal Procedure, effective Jan. 1, 1968, and taking precedence over these statutes, provided that in indirect criminal
contempts, all questions of fact must be decided by a jury of six. FLA. R. CRim. P. 1.840 (a)(4).
However, this provision remained in effect for only two months before it was amended on
Feb. 28, 1968, to conform to the original statutory provisions. To comply with the present
decision, either the Florida supreme court must reamend the rules to provide that a sentence
of over six months may not be imposed for any contempt without a jury trial or a waiver
thereof, or the legislature must pass a statute limiting the punishment for all contempts to
six months. The former alternative appears more appropriate.
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except that it not be "excessive," because it is not an offense covered by the
Illinois Criminal Code.9 In the present case the Illinois supreme court relied
on cases1° holding that criminal contempt, though criminal in nature, was
not a violation of the criminal law and therefore all of the rights and formalities that are required in a criminal proceeding do not attach in a contempt
proceeding. 1
Earlier, the United States Supreme Court had held that in neither the
federal courts, 12 nor the state courts, 1 was there a right to trial by jury in
any contempt proceeding. In In re Debs,14 the Court said that it would seriously limit the efficiency of a contempt proceeding to submit the question to
a jury or another court. The Supreme Court's view became so well established
that as late as 1957, in Green v. United States,' 5 Justice Harlan said: "The
statements of this Court in a long and unbroken line of decisions involving
contempts . . . establish beyond peradventure that criminal contempts are
not subject to jury trial as a matter of constitutional right."
In 1964, the first sign of change came in United States v. Barnett.', While
holding that the Governor and Lieutenant Governor of Mississippi were not
entitled to a jury trial in a contempt proceeding against them in federal
court, Mr. Justice Clark stated in a footnote 7 that some members of the
Court felt the punishment for criminal contempt by a summary proceeding
without a jury should be constitutionally limited to the punishment provided
for petty offenses. In support of this idea, Justice Clark referred to District
of Columbia v. Clowans,'8 which stated that regardless of the seriousness of
the offense itself, if punishment was sufficiently severe, the right to trial by
jury should be available. The question of jury trial in Barnett had been
certified' 9 to the Supreme Court before the trial of the alleged contemnors.
The footnote served as a warning to the lower court that if a sentence of more
than six months20 was ultimately imposed, there might be a right to a jury
trial.
9. 38 ILL. ANN. STAT. (Smith-Hurd 1967). The provision that limits a sentence for an
offense for which there is no penalty provided to one year or a fine of $1,000, 38 ILL ANN.
STAT. §1-7 (j) (Smith-Hurd 1967), has been held inapplicable to contempts, People v. Stollar,
31 Il. 2d 154, 201 N.E.2d 97 (1964), because of another provision, 38 ILL. ANN. STAT. §1-3
(Smith-Hurd 1967), which provides that contempt should not be affected by any provisions
of the Code.
10. People v. Severinghaus, 313 Ill. 456, 145 N.E. 220 (1924); People v. Panchire, 311 Ill.
622, 143 N.E. 476 (1924).
11. But see cases cited infra note 29.
12. United States v. United Mine Workers, 330 U.S. 258, 298 (1947); Gompers v. United
States, 233 U.S. 604, 610-11 (1914); In re Debs, 158 U.S. 564, 594-96 (1895).
13. Eilenbecker v. District Court of Plymouth County, 134 U.S. 31, 36-39 (1890).
14. 158 U.S. 564, 595 (1895).
15. 356 U.S. 165, 183 (1958).
16. 376 U.S. 681 (1964).
17. Id. at 694 n. 12.
18. 300 U.S. 617 (1937).
19. 28 U.S.C. §1254(3) (1964).
20. 18 U.S.C. §1 (3) (1964). Any misdemeanor, the penalty for which does not exceed
imprisonment for a period of six months or a fine of not more than $500, or both, is a

petty offense.
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Scholarly dissents in Green and Barnett, coupled with the majority's
dictum in Barnett paved the way for the decision in Cheff v. Schnackenberg.21
In that case, the Court refused to overturn a sentence of six months imprisonment for criminal contempt of a federal court. It analogized a criminal
contempt punished by six months imprisonment or less to a "petty offense,"22
for which there is no right to jury trial. Although it upheld the sentence, the
Court directed that sentences exceeding six months imprisonment for criminal contempt could not be imposed by a federal court without a jury trial
or a waiver thereof.23
The "petty offense" classification enables the judge to know whether a
jury trial is a matter of right before the trial begins, because such classification
is based upon the maximum possible penalty that can be imposed for the
offense. However, under federal law,24 there is no limit or declaration of
the maximum penalty to which a defendant may be exposed for criminal
contempt. Consequently, it is uncertain before trial what sentence, if any,
will be imposed. This makes contempts unique in that the "maximum possible penalty" standard of deciding whether certain rights attach cannot be
applied to them, unless jury trials are granted in all cases . However, the
25
Court in both Cheff
and the present case held that in the absence of a
definite maximum penalty, the sentence actually imposed was the best evidence of the seriousness of the offense. Thus, a criminal contempt that is
punished by more than six months imprisonment is deemed a "serious contempt," for which there must be a right to trial by jury.
In Duncan v. Louisana,26 the defendant was convicted of simple battery
and sentenced to sixty days in jail and a 150 dollar fine. Because the maximum penalty for this offense was two years imprisonment and a 300 dollar
fine, the Supreme Court held that the denial of defendant's request for a
jury trial constituted a deprivation of his liberty and property without due
process of law. When the Court held "that the Fourteenth Amendment
guarantees a right of jury trial in all criminal cases which-were they to
be tried in a federal court-would come within the Sixth Amendment's
guarantee," 27 it allowed application of the federal precedents (Barnett and
Cheft) to the states and opened the door for the instant decision.
The 'Court decided in the present opinion that criminal contempts are
indistinguishable from crimes, 28 and that since under the Duncan decision
the states were required to provide jury trials for serious crimes, they now must
21. 384 U.S. 373 (1966); Note, Constitutional Law: The Supreme Court Constructs a
Limited Right to Trial by Jury for Federal Criminal Contemnors, 1967 DUKE LJ. 632
(1967); Comment, Constitutional Law: The Right to Jury Trial for Criminal Contempt,
19 U. FA. L. R v. 382 (1966).

22. 384 US. at 379 (1966).
23. 884 US. at 380 (1966).
24. 18 US.C. §§401, 402 (1964); Green v. United States, 356 U.S. 165 (1958); Brown
v. United States, 859 US. 41, 52, rehearing denied, 859 US. 976 (1959).
25. 884 US. at 880 (1966).

26. 88 S. CL 1444 (1968).
27. 88 S. Ct. at 1447 (1968).
28. 88 S. Ct. at 1481 (1968) ("Criminal contempt is a crime in the ordinary sense ...
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also provide jury trials for serious contempts. This is a desirable and logical
result because of the many other areas where crimes and criminal contempts
are treated identically.29 Mr. Justice White acknowledged the long line of authority against jury trials in contempt cases but said that this in itself was not
a sufficient reason to refrain from changing a rule that was constitutionally
infirm.
In dictum the Court also limited the use of summary proceedings in cases
of direct criminal contempt.30 It presumed that most of such contempts in
the presence of the Court would fall within the "petty offense" category, but
indicated that those which did not should be subject to jury trial. 31 Thus,
the Court has impliedly overruled a long list of cases holding or assuming
that judges have almost unlimited power to punish for direct contempt. 32
Thus, the instant case has made it clear that in state criminal contempt
proceedings, just as in the federal courts, a sentence of more than six
months may not be imposed without a jury trial or a waiver thereof. 33 However, the test used to designate "serious contempts," is inadequate in that a
judge cannot know what penalty will be imposed until the trial is over.
Therefore, he must guess at the penalty, if any, which might be imposed
before the trial begins, in order to determine whether to impanel a jury.
There are two problems inherent in this procedure: if the judge miscalculates, either a new trial will result or he will have unnecessarily empaneled
a jury; and it could deter judges from imposing sentences of more than six
months, even if justified, when there has been no jury trial. 34 Notwithstanding these shortcomings, the present decision is a meritorious step in
29. E.g., Ungar v. Sarafite, 376 U.S. 575, 584 (1964) (right to an unbiased judge); Wood
v. Georgia, 370 U.S. 375 (1962); Pennekamp v. Florida, 328 U.S. 331 (1946) (right to free
speech); Green v. United States, 356 U.S. 165, 188 (1958) (right to appeal); In re Oliver,
333 U.S. 257, 266-73 (1948) (right to public trial); In re Bradley, 318 U.S. 50, 52 (1943)
(immunity from double jeopardy); Pendergast v. United States, 317 U.S. 412, 417-21 (1943)
(protection of statutes of limitation); Gompers v. Buck's Stove & Range Co., 221 U.S. 418
(1911); Michaelson v. United States, 266 U.S. 42, 66 (1924); Ex parte Grossman, 267, U.S.
87, 118-22 (1925) (availability of executive pardon); FED. R. GRIM. P. 42 (b) (right to bail);
Annot., 54 A.L.R. 1437 (1928) (privilege against self-incrimination); Annot., 49 A.L.R. 975
(1927) (guilt must be proved beyond a reasonable doubt).
30. 88 S. Ct. at 1486 (1968).
31. FED. R. CQuM. P. 42 (a) Summary Disposition: A criminal contempt may be punished
summarily if the judge certifies that he saw or heard the conduct constituting the contempt
and that it was committed in the actual presence of the court. The order of contempt
shall recite the facts and shall be signed by the judge and entered of record. FLA. R. CuIM.
P. 1.830 provides for the same procedure.
32. E.g., Offutt v. United States, 348 U.S. 11 (1954); Sacher v. United States, 343 U.S.
1, 8 (1952); Cooke v. United States, 267 U.S. 517 (1925); Ex parte Terry, 128 U.S. 289 (1888).
33. The Court, in none of the contempt cases nor in Duncan, discusses whether a fine
of more than $500, which takes an offense out of the "petty offense" category, will trigger
the right to trial by jury. Fines are certainly a deprivation of property, and this question
is left open by the Court.
34. See generally Cheff v. Schnackenberg, 384 U.S. 373, 382 (concurring opinion), 393
(dissenting opinion) (1966). Note, Criminal Contempt -Right to Jury Trial-Disobedience
of Court of Appeals Order, 29 ALBANY L. REv. 138, 141-42 (1965); Note, supra note 21, at
643 n.55; Note, Constitutional Right to Jury Trial in Criminal Contempt Cases, 63 MicH.
L. REv. 700, 703-04 (1965).
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